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THE STRUCTURES OF LAW AND LITERATURE: DUTY, 
JUSTICE, AND EVIL IN THE CULTURAL IMAGINATION, by 
Jeffrey Miller 1
JACK LLOYD
IN THE STRUCTURES OF LAW AND LITERATURE: Duty, Justice, and Evil in the 
Cultural Imagination, Jeff rey Miller analyzes the scholarly fi eld of law and literature 
through the lens of Northrop Frye’s archetypal criticism.2 In six chapters, the 
book proposes that the study of law and literature is best accomplished through 
Frye’s “archetypal” literary criticism.3 
Chapter one criticises the law and literature fi eld and how it is taught in 
law schools. Miller takes issue with the fact that “professors teaching the classes 
frequently “h ave little or no training in literary theory.”4 In addition, literary 
criticism itself is challenged as “faddish,”5 and the reluctance amongst law and 
literature scholars to engage with Frye’s work because it is outdated is described as 
misplaced because “archetypal criticism does not contemplate invalidating other 
critical approaches.”6 
Th e second chapter deals largely with creation narratives from the Christian 
Bible and their relevance to the development of law. Miller associates the teachings 
of Jesus with the concept of precedent, and analyzes the patterns seen in both the 
stories of Moses and Jesus as they relate to our conceptions of modern law and 
justice. Works by John Updike, Nadine Gordimer, JM Coetzee, Franz Kafka, 
1. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013) 242 pages.
2. Frye is considered one of the most infl uential literary critics of the twentieth century. Frye’s 
Anatomy of Criticism and its archetypal view of literature is promoted by Miller as an analytic 
tool for studying law and literature. See e.g. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
3. Supra note 1 at 150.
4. Ibid at 7.
5. Ibid at 5.
6. Ibid.
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and Albert Camus are discussed through the Fryegian lens, illustrating how they 
enhance our understanding of law.
Chapter three examines social and legal duty as well as the interaction between 
narrative and conceptions of justice, both real and literary. Miller illustrates how 
the reasonable person standard evolved from biblical stories of exemplary persons 
of faith, such as Moses or Job.7 Th e tale of Moses on Pisgeh is used to expostulate 
on comparative law between the faiths of Judaism and Christianity.8 
Mordecai Richler’s St. Urbain’s Horseman is discussed in relation to 
duty and justice in the context of sexual assault.9 Th e plot device of “Th e 
Bedtrick”10 is extrapolated upon through discussion of Richler’s narrative. 
Th e literary and legal fascination with this plot device is then related to the 
English case of R v Collins,11 in which a woman mistakenly has sex with an 
intruder, believing him to be her boyfriend. 
Th e fourth chapter is an examination of how literature refl ects on the role 
of social and legal duty using James Kelman, Franz Kafka, John Milton, and 
others, to investigate the ways in which duty is created, understood, and breached. 
Society’s creation of duty through narratives about Hell12 is discussed, particularly 
in relation to Milton. In addition, Kelman’s blind, desperately alcoholic narrator 
in How Late It Was, How Late is examined to help us see the literary, legal, and 
real-world implications of a duty and its breach.13 
Chapter fi ve presents an analytic framework for viewing the law in and 
as literature. Th e chapter focuses on the similarities and diff erences in how 
literature and the law use language. Miller discusses the role of the priestly 
class in mediating between “the language of God and the vulgate” and the role 
of judges in mediating between “legalese and the vernacular.”14 Th e role of 
stare decisis and language is dealt with through discussion of a variety of cases 
in which complex interpretive tools were used by judges and lawyers “in an 
7. Ibid at 65.
8. Ibid at 98.
9. Ibid at 74-78. See e.g. Mordecai Richler, St. Urbain’s Horseman (Toronto: McLelland & 
Stewart, 1971).
10. Th e Bedtrick is a plot device in literature whereby Person A engages in sexual intercourse 
with Person B in the mistaken belief that Person B is in fact Person C. See e.g. Wendy 
Doniger, Th e Bedtrick: Tales of Sex and Masquerade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
11. R v Collins, [1972] 2 All ER 1105, [1973] 3 WLR 243.
12. Supra note 1 at 119.
13. Ibid at 116. See e.g. James Kelman, How Late It Was, How Late (London, UK: Vintage, 
1994).
14. Ibid at 139.
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attempt to reach (Edenic) justice,”15 or at least a form of justice that is usually 
only seen in literature. 
Th e fi nal chapter reiterates the value of archetypal criticism for law and 
literature studies. Deeper scrutiny of several literary works is conducted. Th e 
Moses story is related to the rule of law,16 as are Golem myths as a form of 
literature promoting the rule of law as a protective measure for subjugated 
groups.17 Th e Book of Job is discussed in the context of remedies for breach 
of contract, and as a method of understanding the reasonable person standard 
and its role in an imperfect world.18 Finally, the magic realism of Marcel Aymé 
is presented as a means to understanding a justice system which is viewed by 
many as “irremediably broken.”19 
Miller presents a valid argument for promoting Fryegian analysis in the 
law and literature fi eld without discounting other critical views of the subject. 
While it would be impossible to delineate any one “right way” to conduct 
law and literature criticism, Miller illustrates numerous areas that are ripe for 
further study. 
15. Ibid at 145.
16. Ibid at 151.
17. Ibid at 185.
18. Ibid at 160.
19. Ibid at 198.
